On Friday, July 18, 1924 , Robert W. Imbrie, United States Consul in Tehranand personal friend and special agent of Allen W. Dulles, Chief of the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs Division-was brutally killed. Imbrie was beaten to death by a mob led by members of the Muslim clergy and including many members of the Iranian Army. In the weeks preceding July 18, there had been several outbreaks of anti-Bahai violence. Imbrie and Melvin SeYq10ur ha<;l gone that morning to investigate a miraculous watering place in central Tehran that figured in the anti-Bahai excitement. According to contemporary accounts, a Bahai had been struck blind after drinking from the source when he refused to make an offering in the name of the Shici saints; his sight miraculously had been restored after he had repented and made the donation. I Imbrie's motive for visiting the shrine (saqqa-khaneh) has never been clear. Presumably he was investigating in his capacity as consul. However, he took a camera along to take photographs for the National Geographic Society, and the camera was cited by the Iranian government as a cause of what subsequently occurred. Imbrie seems to have expected trouble. He brought Seymour, an oilfield roughne~k who had been imprisoned by the Consulate for repeatedly bludgeoning his foreman, with him as a bodyguard. 2 After Imbrie had taken photographs of people at the watering place, Imbrie and Seymour were identified as Bahais by a: 17-year-old mullah, Sayyid Husain, who accused them of having poisoned the source. The crowd attacked Imbrie, who continued to take pictures, and Seymour, who wielded Imbrie's "shillelagh." (The word was Seymour's; the State Department identified the device as a blackjack.) Unharmed, the Americans momentarily escaped in their carriage. 3 The mob caught up with them when the carriage was detained by a policeman outside the main barracks of the Pah1avi regiment of the Cossack Brigade, the most important military force in Iran. Prime Minister Reza Khan Pahlavi Was the Cossack commander. Here the crowd was joined by many soldiers, who pulled Imbrie to the street and beat him. Seymour was attacked on the Cossack parade ground. Despite the presence of many police officers-the main Tehran police headquarters was across the street-both Imbrie and Seymour were very seriously injured before they were finally rescued by the police. In explanation of their timidity, police officials later admitted that they were afraid of the Cossacks, who were the real authority in Tehran, and that they were under orders not to interfere in anti-Bah'ai disturbances. There were about 2,000 rioters. 4 Imbrie and Seymour were attacked a third time as they lay helpless in a hospital inside the police headquarters. Seymour survived, perhaps because he already looked dead. Mrs. Katherine Gillespie Imbrie preferred to believe that the mob passed him by because his naked body displayed "certain physical appearances [which] gave evidence that Seymour might be a Mohammedan."s Imbrie received fatal blows. None of the more than 130 wounds, caused mostly by stones, sticks, and paving tiles, was alone sufficient to cause death-including the saber cut that flayed Imbrie's scalp to the bone. His body could not withstand the shock, however, of what the attending physician described as "the most brutal assault that I have ever known." Conscious to the end, Imbrie expired about 3:00 P.M., about four hours after the attack began. 6 This murder was instrumental in Reza Khan's consolidation of power in Iran. In the view of tke British Military Attache, Colonel W. A. K. Fraser, "The event gave him ... the excuse for declaring martial law and a censorship of the Press .... Numerous arrests have been made, chiefly of political opponents of the Prime Minister.,,7 The American view was even stronger. According to Major Sherman Miles, a United States Army General Staff officer sent to Tehran to investigate, the murder was deliberate. Miles concluded that the anti-Bahai rioting in Tehran was intended by the Iranian government to end in the death of a foreigner. Reza Khan wanted a foreigner to die "so that he could declare martial law and check the power of the Mullahs.,,8
IMBRIE'S CAREER
The man who thus died was not an ordinary American diplomat; he was a spy-adventurer. Imbrie had trained for the law at George Washington and Yale Universities, but he had been bored by its practice. Mter escaping briefly to a Congo expedition in 1911, he joined the French Army as an ambulance driver when the Great War broke out. He served at Verdun and on the Salonika front before leaving in 1917 to join the American Foreign Service as a special consular agent in Petrograd. 9 In Russia he was loud and violent in defense of American interests. According to a New York Times account,10 he had beaten with his walking stick on the desk of Ouritsky, the Petrograd head of the Cheka (the Soviet secret police). He became a notorious anti-Bolshevik. He distinguished himself by acquiring for the State Department a set of documents, subsequently proven to be forgeries, that purported to demonstrate that the Bolshevik government took orders from Berlin. After he was expelled from Soviet territory, he went to Viborg, Finland, in March 1919 to establish and operate "a reconnaissance service for investigation in Soviet Russia." He continued until June 1920, leaving after his Finnish cover was blown. II In 1920 the Department sent him to Istanbul, to work with General Wrangel's White Army in the Crimea. Before Imbrie arrived, however, Wrangel had been defeated and Imbrie was forced to remain in Istanbul, where he found little to occupy his time. His requests to be sent back to Finland or to Bessarabia to operate against the Soviets were denied. 12 Instead, he was assigned in February 1922 to be a special consular agent with the Turkish Nationalist forces in Arratolia. His mission was to establish American diplomatic and commercial influence, and "he succeeded in gaining the confidence and good will of the Angora [Ankara] leaders in an unusual measure," demonstrating "exceptional capacity for dealing with perplexing and perhaps dangerous situations in out of the way places." According to Admiral Colby M. Chester, "Mr. Imbrie did more to secure the success of thIS enterprise [the Chester Project] than any other official.,,!3 This success was achieved at the cost of offending grecophiles.
In July 1923 Imbrie was recalled to Washington to answer charges/ 4 most notably that he had endangered the life of Louise Bryant, widow of John Reed and wife of William Bullitt, by denouncing her to the Turks as a Bolshevik. 15 After cooling his heels for some time, he was assigned to Tabriz, Iran, to reopen a consulate and to establish an information network on the Soviet Union. Temporarily he was assigned to Tehran, to replace Consul Bernard Gotlieb, who was on home leave. 16 He had barely arrived when he was killed.
The State Department understood that it was gambling when it sent Imbrie to Iran. "Of course in sending a man of Imbrie's rather impetuous disposition to far away countries we are taking a certain risk," wrote Allen Dulles, on September 19, 1923 . "The only question is as to whether the advantages to be gained would justify this risk. I am rather inclined to think they would.,,17 The gamble failed; Imbrie's impetuosity contributed to his death. 18 Naturally, in view of his anti-Soviet background, the question of Communist complicity in the attack on Imbrie was raised. Despite accounts that the Bolsheviks had put a $40,000 (gold) price on his head, the State Department could find no evidence of Bolshevik culpability.19 All the evidence pointed solely to Iranian responsibility, abetted by Imbrie's bad judgment.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REACTION
The official American reaction to Imbrie's murder was very harsh and very concerned to maintain U.S. prestige. The American government insisted on speedy prosecution, and it intervened in the process to ensure that individuals it believed to be guilty were punished. In addition to insisting on blood punishment, the United States insisted that Iran pay blood money. Mrs. Imbrie was given $60,000 in compensation for the loss of her husband. She was not satisfied and for years tried to get additional funds. The State Department believed that $60,000 was appropriate, given its study of precedents, but Congress relented in 1926 and voted her an additional $25,000. 22
Seymour was given $3,000 in compensation for his injuries, an amount that barely covered his lost wages and transporation costs home. The State Department refused to discuss any liability for his having been endangered by Consul Imbrie while in custody.23
The U.S. Government received $110,000 in payment for some of its expenses in the transport of Imbrie's body to Washington by the U.S.S. Trenton, the newest ship in the American fleet. Charge Murray suggested that this moneyoe used to establish a scholarship fund for Iranian students in the United States, after the model of the Boxer Rebellion indemnity. The State Department announced that this would be done, but the fund was never established. 24
The United States also insisted that Imbrie's body be treated with full military honors en route out of the country. American authorities accompanied the body to ensure that Iranian Army and civil officials paid proper respects to Imbrie's . 25 remams.
At the time this occ).lrred, U.S. officials privately expressed the opinion that Iran was lucky that it had been the American consul who had been killed and not the British· consul. British reaction, Americans assumed, would have been much harsher. They seemed to be proved wrong, however, when on October 27, 1924, a British subject named Cox, an "ex-NCO of the Somersets and of the South Persia Rifles, who settled down in Shiraz after his demobilization as a garage proprietor," was killed on the Shiraz-Bushire road by Iranian Gendarmes under circumstances suggesting murder. Britain, concerned with larger questions of security in the oil fields, raised no protest 26 RECENT IRANIAN HISTORY Although this episode has mostly faded from Iranian and American conciousness, it appears to have been of importance both in Iranian history and in the history of American relations with Iran. Imbrie was caught in civil violence whose origins were very old.
Since the Safavid dynasty had transformed Iran into a Shici state in the sixteenth century, Iranian public consciousness had largely identified Iran with Shici Islam.27 Some Shici theologians saw secular authority as a usurpation from the legitimate authority of the hidden Imam. In Qajar times (since the early nineteenth century) the ulama had gradually put themselves forward as the protectors of the people against the tyranny of the shahs and of other secular authorities. This clerical-civil rivalry, along with hostility toward foreign influence, had been a major component in the development of the Iranian revolutionary movement, notably in the Tobacco Protest of [1891] [1892] and in the Constitutional period of [1905] [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] [1910] [1911] . The clergy expressed hostility toward foreign influence, which seemed to dominate the shahs, and they succeeded in mobilizing mass support behind national ideas. The British tobacco monopoly was quashed by Nasir aI-Din Shah and a Constitution was accepted by Muzaffar aI-Din Shah largely due to clerically supported mass urban demonstrations, against which the government was powerless. 28
The reality of increasing foreign control could not be countered by Iranian clerical action, and during the First World War, Iran was a battlefield for Turkish, Russian, British, and German forces. After the war only the British remained, and in 1919 London attempted to impose a protectorate. Iranian public opinion was extremely hostile, however, and the Iranian parliament (Majlis) refused to ratify the treaty.29
,"
EARLY IRANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Other than the Protestant missionaries who had established schools and hospitals a half-century before the United States actually established diplomatic relations with Iran, there was little American interest in Iran before World War II.30 Iran, however, was interested in relations with America. Since the early nineteenth century, Iranian foreign policy had been dominated by the reality of the imperialist threats from Russia and from Britain, and since the Napoleonic wars Iran had sought to balance the power of these two imperialist rivals by drawing a third great power into the struggle. France, Germany, and the United States have been such third powers.3! During the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) there were two private American involvements of consequence. Howard Baskerville, a young Princeton graduate and a teacher in the Presbyterian mission school in Tabriz, martyred himself for the Iranian Constitutional cause, dying in the defense of besieged Tabriz. 32 On a more substantive level, the Majlis in 1911 hired Morgan Shuster to be Controller General of the Iranian Treasury. Although Shuster was engaged as a private citizen, he had been recommended by the State Department and his mission was therefore regarded as quasi-official by the Iranian revolutionaries. Within a few months Shuster's success at collecting taxes and regularizing the distribution of revenue had .(1) alienated large numbers of wealthy Iranians, (2) given the Majlis hope that it would be able to organize the country financially, and (3) in the south. Although Britain publicly maintained that the coup was not a British affair,37 it seems to have been. 38 Reza Khan had been personally selected by General Edmund Ironside, commander of British forces in Iran, to command the Cossack Brigade after its Russian officers had been removed by the British. Ironside encouraged Reza to seize control in Tehran, and the details of the affair were planned in coordination with Lieutenant Colonel H. Smyth, the British officer in charge of "the affairs ofthe Cossack Brigade, ,,39 and Walter Alexander Smart, the Oriental Secretary of the British Legation. The British Minister, Herman Cameron Norman, claimed to have had no advance knowledge of the coup. However, Norman had encouraged Smyth to send Reza with a troop of Cossacks to Tehran to replace the 600 unruly Cossacks already there. 40 After the coup, Norman urged his government to support the new regime, which he characterized as being "hailed with utmost satisfaction .. _ as the most favourable to British interests which could possibly have arisen. ,,41 In his diary Ironside observed, "I fancy that everybody thinks' that I engineered the coup d'etat. I suppose I did, strictly speaking. ,,42 There is no conclusive proof of higher British involvement, but the events have always encouraged Iranian belief that the British government was responsible for the coup. In this regard it is curious indeed that, within a short time and apparently on the explicit instructions of Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, three of the highest-ranking British officials in Iran-Norman, Councellor of Legation Reginald Bridgeman, and Military Attache General W. E. R. Dickson-were all forced to retire. All three men had questioned Curzon's conduct of policy in Iran. Dickson in particular had publicly made known his disapproval of British involvement in the coup. All three men were quickly removed from the scene. 43 The Minister (in 1923), and Shah (in 1925) . He eliminated rivals from positions of power; Zia and many other early associates were forced into exile, or worse. He suppressed rival military forces: The Gendarmerie was merged with the Cossacks into a ~ew Army, rival nationalist leaders were subdued, and the independence of the tribes was crushed. Reza's dependence on British money was lessened by the engagement of an American financial mission under Arthur C. Millspaugh, which collected taxes, restructured the revenue system, and ensured the regular payment of government personnel. 45 
THE MILLSPAUGH MISSION
During the early years of the Millspaugh ffilSSlOn (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) , the United States became deeply involved in Iranian affairs. Millspaugh was arrogant,_ tactless, and pro-Pahlavi. As a critical Briton observed, "Dr. Millspaugh is, perhaps, no diplomat, nor does his report indicate any latent talent for literature. 'The Americans have no political purposes whatsoever,' he says, yet he comes out openly in favor of Sardar Sepah as the only possible ruler of the country.,,46 The American financial advisors nevertheless did regularize the collection of Iranian government revenue, and they did succeed in controlling government expenditure. This was achieved at great cost to Iran, however. In the words of British Charge Harold Nicolson, "The American Mission, while enriching the Persian Government, have impoverished Persia. The taxation levied is uneconomic; the purchasing power of the country has generally declined. ,,47 The success of Millspaugh's advice to the Iranian Treasury was essential to Reza Khan's consolidation of power, and the U.S. thus helped to lay the foundations of the Pahlavi Monarchy.48
A FAILED REPUBLIC In his rise to power Reza made one major misstep. In March 1924, attempting to follow the model of Turkey, Reza tried to depose the Qajar dynasty and to create a republic with himself as president. He assumed that, because he had carefully supervised the Majlis elections, the Parliament would vote enabling legislation. Instead, he faced a determined clerical-led opposition: Sayyid Hasan Modarres, who had been imprisoned by Reza at the time of the 1921 coup, led the resistance in the Majlis, and many mullahs in Tehran led mass demonstra_ tions against the republic. Reza capitulated. He withdrew the legislation from the Majlis, went to Qom to confer with the religious leaders, and announced his agreement that a republic was contrary to Islam. 49 In the next several months there were many suggestions that Reza had lost his grip and that he would soon be forced from office. The f-ollowing events stand out:
I. The American-run Treasury took steps to restrict the amount of government revenue Reza Khan could spend on the army. Millspaugh had actually delivered an ultimatum on July 17, 1924. This potentially threatened Reza's monopoly of force within the government. 50 2. Sheikh Khazal of Khuzistan, a notorious British protege and the chief military force in the oilcproducing province, began to talk of independence. Not only would the independence of "Arabistan" have been a blow to Iranian integrity, it would also have cut off oil revenues just as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was beginning to pay royalties. 51 3. Attempts faltered to break the British oil monopoly and to gain a massive American loan. A contract with Standard Oil for a concession in the north of Iran was destroyed by APOC insistence on a 50% share of Standard operations in Iran as the price for transit rights across the territory of the British concession (the entire southern two-thirds of the country). A contract with Sinclair Oil Company for a northern concession, which might have marketed Iranian oil through Soviet territory, was stalled in the Majlis. The election of Modarres as chairman of the Majlis Oil Commission suggested that Reza's opponents were in a position to deny him independent sources of revenue. 52 4. Mass demonstrations led by clergy denouncing the tyranny of the government ,were permitted in the streets of Tehran, unhindered by the army or the police. "Opinion in diplomatic circles here and among residents of experience is practically unanimous that Sardar Sepah's influence is waning," the British Legation reported on July 1, 1924. After Mir Zadeh Eshqi, an anti-Pahlavi poet and journalist, was murdered, 30,000 mourners (at a time when Tehran had only about 150,000 inhabitants) heard the Prime Minister denounced as "a murderer and assassin and the oppressor of the people. ,,53 The impotence of the government was noted in the press, and army officers chafed at Reza's weakness. 54 In an attempt to divert popular opinion from its weakness, the government seems to have encouraged anti-Bahai violence. The Bahai faith, which began in Iran in the mid-nineteenth century, frequently had been the object of popular and governmental attack. Muslims believe the faith to be a heretical break-off from Islam, and consequently Bahais are not accorded the toleration allowed Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians. The Bahai faith has also converted many Muslims, which helps to account for the violence of clerical anti:-Bahai rhetoric; in Islam apostasy is forbidden and is punishable by death. Bahais also have been associated in the Iranian mind with foreign influence, in part because the Bahais were among the first to adopt Western styles of dress. The faith explicitly encourages scientific innovation. After the Bahai faith spread in the West, especially in America, there were many contacts between Western Bahais and their Iranian coreligionists. Bahais have been very prominent among the Iranian associates of foreigners, including Americans. For all these reasons Iranian xenophobia has more than once taken the form of anti-Bahai rioting. Such violence was rampant in Tehran in the weeks before Imbrie was killed. 55 Indeed, Imbrie himself observed and intervened in the rioting. He believed that the government was encouraging the anti-Bahai disturbances as a means of diverting public attention from its failures. In Imbrie's own words, "At every teahouse a Mullah harranged [sic] the crowd. Mobs, fired by oratory and hashish, swarmed through the streets, unhindered by the Police, crying against the Bahaists. ,,56 When two American Bahai medical missionaries (Susan 1. Moody, M.D., and Elizabeth H. Steward, R.N.) drew the attention of the crowds in mid-July, Imbrie requested police protection for them, which was quickly provided. 57 There is no suggestion in the diplomatic record that in so doing he called fatal attention to himself, although a Bahai account now asserts that "any American in Iran was automatically assumed by the populace to be a Bahai. ,,58 Imbrie's curiosity thus having been piqued, his presence at the saqqakhaneh on the 18th does seem understandable, if reckless. 59 
CONSOLIDATION OF PAHLAVI POWER
Reza Khan used Imbrie's death as a pretext to take action that helped him to consolidate his power in Tehran. He immediately declared martial law and arrested his political opponents. Several opposition editors, who had escaped this dragnet because they had previously taken refuge (bast) in the Majlis to protest against alleged government complicity in the murder of Eshqi, openly accused Reza of using Imbrie's murder to cover illegal action. They suggested that Reza had plotted for violence against a foreigner so that foreign powers' would applaud his subsequent steps to strengthen contro1. 60 Circumstantial evidence suggests that their accusation may have been well founded, for immediately following Imbrie's murder the Iranian government muzzled the opposition press, stopped street demonstrations, strengthened discipline in the army, and curbed the clergy. Westerners applauded Reza Khan's restoration of order, explicitly rejecting any Islamic alternative to military justice. 61 Reza also took advantage of Imbrie's murder to bend Millspaugh and the American Treasury officials to his will. As the Imbrie dispute developed, Washington warned Millspaugh that "for the United States and for the Legation it is of paramount importance that adjustment regarding murder of Vice Consul Imbrie should be reached without delay. It is not the wish of the Department that the raising of any other question should become an obstacle to that adjustment.,,62 The United States thus implicitly encouraged Reza's dictatorship as a price that had to be paid for a satisfactory settlement of the Imbrie dispute. 63 Following the intervention of the State Department, the American-run Iranian Treasury met Reza's minimum demands. 64 The northern oil concession stalemate was not broken, however. According to official American sources, the Imbrie murder caused the termination of the Sinclair contract. 65 That may be, but it is also true that the Teapot Dome scandal made it difficult for Sinclair to raise the Iranian loan that was a condition of the contract, and that the Soviet government was no longer SUre that it wanted an American company extracting oil from Iranian territory adjacent to its borders. 66 Furthermore, Iranian resistance to Sinclair's overtures also stiffened, as Reza's "recently increased autocratic methods" raised skepticism in the Majlis "as to whether any advantages would re~lly accrue to the country were a loan to be negotiated.,,67 In any case, the U~S. government appeared more interested in asserting its prestige during the Imbrie dispute than in pursuing any specific interests.
With the ending of the Iran-U.S. dispute by the execution of CAli and Husain on November 2, 1924, Reza was free to leave the capital city. He had support from the foreign legations, he had secured financing for the army, he had reestablished discipline in tll<: Cossack Brigade, and by executing Sayyid Husaina mullah-he had demonstrated his domination over the clergy. He left Tehran in early November in order to subdue Sheikh Khazal of Khuzistan. By destroying Khazal's autonomy, in the course of the next months' campaign, he completed the unification of Iran and ensured that his government would get all the APOC royalties. 68 From his triumph in the south, Reza went on pilgrimage to the Shici shrines at Najaf and Karbala in adjacent Iraq. One of the strengths of the Shici ulama in their rivalry with the Iranian Shahs had always been that, because their leaders resided in Iraq, they were beyond the temporal control of the Iranian government. By making this pilgrimage, Reza emphasized that he had achieved complete control in Iran. By receiving him, the mujtahids and the British recognized his authority. Reza Khan consequently returned to Tehran)n triumph: His control over Iran was complete, and the Peacock Throne was practically his for the taking. 69 While the Imbrie affair was not the only critical event in Reza's seizure of total power in Iran, it came at a critical moment in his rise. Reza may well have set in motion some of the forces that led to the fatal events of July 18, 1924 ; certainly he used the murder to his best advantage.
IMBRIE AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN
During the years immediately preceding Imbrie's murder there was an expansion of American participation in Iranian affairs. The two abortive American oil concessions in the north of Iran were an important feature of this development. As the voluminous files on this matter in the American diplomatic archives suggest, had either of these proposals come into effect, there might have been a vast increase in American involvement in Iran, comparable, perhaps, to what occurred after the Second World War. There would have been, in any case, an immediate infusion of American money into Iranian government coffers. It is clear that Millspaugh and the U.S. government favored this development, a possibility postponed by Imbrie's death. 70 Circumstantial evidence suggests that Imbrie's assignment to Iran was a key part of this proposed expansion of America.n involvement. Assistance to com-mercial enterprises is a normal consular duty, of course, and Imbrie had assisted in the negotiation of the Chester concession in Turkey. Further, the Sinclair proposal was based on cooperation with the Soviet Union, and Imbrie was a Soviet expert. In addition, Imbrie was on close terms with the Sinclair representative in Tehran, Ralph H. Soper (who some, including Mrs. Imbrie, believed to have been the intended victim of the mob). Finally, the termination of the concession project because of Imbrie's death suggests that his assignment to Iran had been important to the project: no Imbrie, no concession. 71 After 1924, American involvement was sharply reduced, with "American interests in Persia ... center [ed] largely around the activities of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions." 72 Imbrie's assignment to Iran also had marked the emergence of an American policy toward Iran that was concerned more with the Soviet Union than with Iran. Clearly Imbrie was a man obsessed by the Bolshevik threat, and the Department of State had sent him to an area bordering the Soviet Union in order to collect information about the Soviets. American policy in Iran, including both the Millspaugh mission and the oil projects, favored the emergence of Reza Khan-in the hope that he would be able to stiffen Iranian resistance to Communist expansion. Secondarily the United States hoped that Reza would be able to safeguard the interests of the United States in Iran and encourage the development of a modern, Western-style economy and society.73 Motives were mixed, but American observations of Iran were skewed by a world view that increasingly saw events in the context of a great struggle with the Red menace. Imbrie's death temporarily reduced American involvement in Iran, but it did not change a view of the world that was to prevail when the United States next became enmeshed in Iranian affairs.
.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the nominal harshness of the American response to the Imbrie killing, the United States continued to support Reza Khan's consolidation of power. The United States wanted Iran to recognize its strength and majesty, which had been affronted by the murder of its consul. Only Reza seemed to be in a position to do this. The United States was extraordinarily restrained in its public acceptance of the official Iranian explanations of what had occurred. 74 Notwithstanding an outward show of insistence that justice be done, the State Department in fact seemed most concerned to maintain American prestige (indeed, "justice" seems almost to have been a code word for "prestige" in State Department usage).
The Department demanded that Millspaugh give way in his dispute with Reza over the amount of money available to the army,75 knowing that this would enable Reza to augment his power. "Whatever justice we obtain must come from him through his military courts," the Legation reasoned. 76 U.S. Charge Murray was quite clear, after meeting with Modarres, that Reza Khan was the only alternative to fanaticism led by a "senile old man.,,77 Suspecting that Reza personally was responsible for the violence that had led to Imbrie's death~ as Major Miles had reported after his investigation, the United States nevertheless approved Reza Khan's "desire to create a disciplined armed force in this country and not to be the commander of a horde of tribesmen. ,,78 Consequently, the United States acted as if Reza's regime was the best hope for American interests and prestige in Iran and effectively closed its consciousness to any possible Pahlavi complicity in the murder of a representative of· the United States government.
The Imbrie affair also accelerated a 1924 United States policy shift in Iran from rivalry with Great Britain toward cooperation. After the war, the United States had opposed much of British policy in Iran, especially the proposed protectorate and the exclusive control of Iranian oil. In return, the British opposed the American oil initiatives. There had been a real Anglo-American rivalry in Iran: The British Legation in Tehran believed that Murray "hardly takes the trouble to conceal his anglophobia.,,79 On reflection, British Minister Sir Percy Loraine considered the entire U.S. Legation to be "very nervous of being thought pro-British." Loraine feared that independent American involvement in Iran might give Iran '~another fatal chance of playing off one Great Power against another, perhaps even of embroiling them .... Anglo-American cooperation might save Persia from herself and from Russia," he continued, but "Anglo-American rivalry destroys [the] last hope of salvation. ,,80 After the murder of Imbrie, however, American policy in Iran moved closely into alignment with that of Great Britain. American unwillingness to accept Modarres as a legitimate leader of Iranian opinion, for example, echoed the British judgment: "The Mujtahid Mudarres," wrote British Charge ~smond Ovey, is "a bigoted and unwashed Sayyid, the Diogenes of the Majlis, who lives in a hovel and ostentatiously refuses money for himself. ,,81 As British Assistant Undersecretary William G. Tyrrell put it on November 12, 1924, "America is being educated in Eastern matters-which is to the good-especially as regards ourselves.,,82 In Iran after 1924, U.S. policy usually deferred to a British lead.
One of the worst-founded conclusions drawn by the United States from the Imbrie affair was the confirmation it perceived for its prejudices about Iran (and other parts of "the Orient"). Iranians were expected to lie. According to Elgin Groseclose, "approbation of deceit permeates Persian literature." 83 James Morier's Hajji Baba,84 which glorified roguish behavior, was a major source for Americans in Iran-it may have been Imbrie's most significant training for his last post. Murray believed that "the Persian is venal. His promises and lip service can be bought for a song. ,,85 Dulles expressed the belief, in a memorandum for Secretary of State Hughes and Undersecretary Grew on October 18, 1924 , that "Morteza's execution was intended more to be a sop to this government than a real effort to execute a guilty person," and therefore he pressed for more executions. 86 It did not matter that CAli and Husain were young, according to an unsigned NEA memorandum, because "human life as such is not greatly valued by orientals.,,87 This widely believed cliche is a species of self-fulfilling prophecy. By categorizing the residents of Iran as "orientals" who do not value "human life as such," the men of the State Department were asserting that Iranians were lesser creatures, fit to be manipulated and brutalized. 88 Such an ethnocentric basis for observing Iran may have seriously skewed American perceptions of reality and provided an unrealistic basis for American foreign policy.
The Imbrie affair also may have seriously skewed Iran's perception of the United States. The American response to Imbrie's murder was intended to make Iran see that the United States of America was powerful and majestic, that the United States insisted on justice, and that justice had to be swift and harsh. As Allen Dulles put it to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 12, 1926, "When you are dealing with a government like Persia ... if you ask them to execute a Moslem for the death of a Christian ... if they do it, you accomplish more for the prestige of your country than if they paid a million. ,,89 What Iran perceived may have been quite different. Despite strong evidence of high-level military involvement in the riot that led to Imbrie's death, the United States did not insist on punishment of high-ranking officers, nor did it distance itself from a prime minister who also had been implicated. Some enlisted men were punished harshly, but incompetent and culpable officers were hardly reprimanded. Some were even promoted. The United States had reason to be critical of Reza, but it chose to see in him the only possible source of "justice." Similarly, the only civilians punished were very young. Of course the United States took care to ensure that both of the condemned boys had passed puberty and that there was no serious reason in Muslim law why they should not be killed. 90 Still, the United States insisted on the shooting of two boys, aged 14 and 17, on the action of a court-martial conducted by officers who had failed to prevent the murder of Imbrie by men under their command. The executions of . CAli and Husain were just as much sops to U.S. opinion as had been that of' • Mortaza. Under these circumstances, Iran reasonably could conclude that the United States, although a great power, could be manipulated, and that, despite sanctimonious talk about justice, the United States winked at abuse of power.
Iranian-American relations were relatively quiescent after 1924, until the Second World War again brought the U.S. into Iranian affairs. When the United States and Iran then became vitally concerned with each other, their mutual understandings and misunderstandings-based in part on the Imbrie affairwould form the basis for their subsequent relations. The Imbrie episode alone did not set the pattern for future American relations with Iran, but it sharply illustrates patterns that already existed, patterns that were reinforced in 1924, and that were to be very important after 1941. In its view of Iran, America supported Pahlavi militarism; it refused to see the ShiCj clergy as legitimate leaders of Iranian national opinion, it was preoccupied by concern with Soviet intentions, and it was increasingly willing to defer to British views and experience. In retrospect, these patterns do not seem to have provided a sound foundation for a healthy American relationship with Iran. Lenczowski, Russia; RG 84, Caldwell, Tehran, telegrams, February 22, 1921, and February 26, 1921 . , 31 Even J. M. Balfour, whose Recent Happenings in Persia (Edinburgh, 1922) was the first British book published about the coup, and who was highly critical of Lord Curzon's policy in Iran, maintained that "the movement was not engineered either by or with the knowledge of the British Legation," p. 218.
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